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RANGEN, INC.'S REPLY BRIEF- ii 
Rangen, Inc. ("Rangen") submits the following Reply Brief to address the arguments made 
the North Snake Ground Water District, Magic Valley Ground Water District, and Southwest 
Irrigation District ( collectively, the "Districts" or "GWDs" or "Respondents"). 
I. ARGUMENT 
The proposed v,:ater right that is at issue in this case serves no mitigation purpose. It is 
simply a legal fiction that the GWDs have advanced in order to avoid curtailment without the 
expense of actually mitigating for the depletive effect of their members' junior-priority 
groundwater pumping. This fact is at the heart of the Director's decision to deny the District's 
application. The Director is intimately familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this 
application and nature of the proposed ''mitigation" use. The Director detennined that: 
[T]he Districts' Application attempts to establish a means to satisfy the required 
mitigation obligation by delivering water to Rangen that Rangen has been using for 
fifty years. The Districts' Application is the epitome of a mitigation shell game. 
The Districts' Application brings no new water to the already diminished flows of 
the Curren Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek. 
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 364, i-134) 1 (Emphasis added). These findings are not disputed by the GWDs. Not 
only has Rangen been using this water for more than fifty years, Rangen has a right to continue to 
use the \Yater in the future under its own permit which the Districts stipulated to during the hearing 
on this case. (A.R., Vol. 2, p. 353, FN4). The water the Districts are seeking to appropriate will 
be used by Rangen regardless of whether this application is ,granted. 
The Director's recognition of the Districts' mitigation shell game must infonn any analysis 
of the Director's decision to deny this application. This is particularly true of the Director's 
findings that the application was filed in bad faith and is not in the local public interest. The 
1 The Clerk's Record on Appeal (R.) includes a disc of the agency record, exhibits, and hearing transcripts for the 
Judicial Review of the Districts' Permit Application, labeled AR_ 2015-83 (AR.). These records shall be referred to 
in the citations herein by "R." and "AR." accordingly. 
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Districts' Response Brief does not address the issue of how this water right would provide any 
mitigation or benefit to Rangen. 
A. The Director's interpretation of water appropriation rules and statutes is 
entitled to great deference. 
The Districts have asserted that this Court should exercise "free reviev.:'' of questions of 
lav,·. Districts' Response Brief; p. 17. While this is true in many contexts, this appeal involves the 
Director of the Department of Water Resources' interpretation of various statutes and rules 
governing the appropriation of water. In this context, there is no such "free review." 
The concept of "free review" of agency decisions involving the interpretation of statutes 
and regulations has been expressly rejected by this Court. See, JR. Simplot Co. Inc. v. Idaho State 
Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991 ). In that case, this Court took careful pause 
to reevaluate judicial review of issues involving questions of law. Guided by United States 
Supreme Court decisions, this Court rejected "free review" holding as follows: 
After reviewing our extensive case history, as well as the holdings of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and various other state courts, we hold that the rule of deference to 
agency statutory constructions retains continuing validity. We hold that a standard 
of "free review" is not applicable to agency determinations. 
Id. at 862. See also, Preston v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 131 Idaho 502, 504, 960 P.2d 185, 
(I 998), citing JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, supra. 
The rule the JR. Sirnplot Court upheld was as follows: 
However, the courts are not alone in their responsibility to interpret and apply the 
lmv. As the need for responsive government has increased, numerous executive 
agencies have been created to help administer the law. To carry out their 
responsibility, administrative agencies are generally "clothed with power to 
construe [the law] as a necessary precedent to administrative action." As a result, 
this Court has long followed the rule that the construction given to a statute by the 
executive and administrative officers of the State is entitled to great weight and \Vill 
be followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise. 
Id. at 854. (Citations omitted). 
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Having rejected "free review," this Court established a "four-prong" test to detennine the 
of deference that can be given to agency decisions. That test is as follo\vs: 
Where an interprets a statute or rule, this Court applies a four-pronged test 
to detennine the appropriate level of deference to the agency interpretation. This 
Court must detennine whether: ( 1) the agency is responsible for administration of 
the rule in issue; (2) the agency's construction is reasonable; (3) the language of the 
rule does not expressly treat the matter at issue; and ( 4) any of the rationales 
underlying the rule of agency deference are present. There are five rationales 
underlying the rule of deference: (1) that a practical interpretation of the rule exists; 
(2) the presumption of legislative acquiescence; (3) reliance on the agency's 
expertise in interpretation of the rule; ( 4) the rationale of repose; and ( 5) the 
requirement of contemporaneous agency interpretation. 
Duncan v. State Bd of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 3,232 P.3d 322,324 (2010). 
The District Court failed to give the proper deference to the Director's interpretation of the 
applicable statutes and rules as required by JR. Simplot and Duncan. 
B. The Director's finding of bad faith should be affirmed. 
The GWDs argue that the Director: "[I]nterpreted Adjudication Rule 45.01.c to require 
construction of infrastructure, then found that the Application did not propose new construction, 
and denied it on that basis." (Districts' Response Brief, p. 20). The Districts argue that this 
interpretation is "contrary to law and leads to absurd results." Id. at 21. 
The District's argument is based upon two premises: (I) that the Court should exercise 
"free reviev/' over the Director's interpretation of IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c; and (2) that the 
Director's interpretation and ruling can be narrowly construed as requiring new construction. 
Neither of these premises is correct. The Districts also contend that the Director's detennination 
that the Districts' application does not propose a "project'' is not supported by substantial 
competent evidence. Districts' Response Brief p. 24. This is also incorrect. 
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1. The Director's interpretation of Rule 45.01.c should be given great 
deference. 
This court does not exercise "free review" of an agency's interpretation a statute or rule. 
Preston 1·. Idaho State Tax Commission, 131 Idaho 502, 504, 960 P.2d 185, (1998), citing JR. 
Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849,862,820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991). As set 
forth in section A above, courts revie\ving an agencv' s internretation of statutes and rules are .._, .._, ., ,A 
required to perfonn a "four-pronged" test to detennine what deference to give the agency. Duncan 
v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 3, 232 P .3d 322, 324 (20 I 0). Despite acknowledging 
the appropriate "four-pronged" test, the Districts argue that "[ w ]hether Rule 45.01 requires new 
construction is a question of law over which courts exercise 'free review.'" The argument was 
expressly rejected by this Court in J.R. Simplot Co., supra. With the proper application of the four-
pronged test, the Director's interpretation of Rule 45.0 I .c is entitled to great deference. 
2. The Districts have misconstrued both Rangen's argument and the 
Director's ruling regarding the existence of a "project." 
The Districts argue that the Director "[I]nterpreted Adjudication Rule 45 .0 l.c to require 
construction of infrastructure, then found that the Application did not propose new construction, 
and denied it on that basis." Districts' Response Brief, p. 20. The Districts claim, and the District 
Court agreed, that requiring "new construction" leads to absurd results because some water right 
applications involve the use of existing diversions rather than new construction. (R., p. 194). The 
Districts' argument does not fairly frame the Director's decision. 
As Rangen argued in its opening brief, the Director's ruling can more fairly be read as 
requiring an identifiable project that can be completed in order to perfect the \Vater right rather 
than imposing a specific requirement of "new construction." The Director found that the lack of 
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such an identifiable project is an impediment to completion of the project. This is a reasonable 
interpretation of Rule 45.01.c. 
This is a unique case because the GWDs do not propose to use the \Vater for which the 
application is filed. The GWDs propose that Rangen will use the water. Essentially, the GWDs 
seek to obtain a \Vater right by doing nothing more than observing and identifying potentially 
unappropriated water. 
In this case, the Rule on good faith allows the Director to examine the substantive actions 
or intent of the parties to construct or complete the project. "The judgment of another person's 
intent can only be based upon the substantive actions that encompass the proposed project." 
IDAPA 37.03.08.045.01.c. In this case, the Director did examine the intent of the GWDs in 
seeking the pennit. Even though the Rules specifically contemplate a "project" and "construction" 
of the project, the Director concluded that the Application was filed in bad faith because the GWDs 
had no intent, at the time the Application was filed, to complete any project. The GWDs' intent 
was to simply obtain the Pennit and assign it to Rangen. Lynn Carlquist, testifying on behalf of 
the GWDs, stated: 
Q. And when I asked you last time [at your deposition], you told me that it was 
your intent it obtain the pennit and then assign the pennit to Rangen for us to 
perfect; correct? 
A. Well, that would be the easiest way for us to perfect it, if they would agree 
to that. 
Q. Okay. So you would be taking advantage of Rangen's existing fish facility 
that it built, correct, to do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You would be taking advantage of the diversion apparatus that Rangen has 
built and has had in place for 50 years to do that; correct? 
A. That's correct. 
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(A.R., Tr. p. 75, 1. 23-25; p. 76, L 1-11 ). 
Based on that testimony, and what the Rules require, the Director made a factual finding 
the application was bad faith: 
26. The District's Application ,vas filed in bad faith because, for a majority of the 
quantity of water sought to be appropriated, there is a threshold impediment to 
"completion of the project." To perfect a project for a water right, there inherently 
must be completion of works for beneficial use. The testimony of Lynn Carlquist 
quoted above demonstrates the Districts' intent at the time of filing the Districts' 
Application ,vas to simply obtain the Permit and assign it to Rangen to perfect by 
utilizing the water in the Rangen facility the ,vay Rangen has done for the last fifty 
years. The initial filing by the Districts did not contemplate any construction of 
works and completion of any project. Furthennore, even at this point, with respect 
to at least 8.0 cfs of the 12 cfs the Districts propose for appropriation, Rangen will 
continue to divert through its existing Bridge Diversion. There is no "project" and 
consequently cannot be a "completion of the project" for the 8.0 cfs, because the 
8.0 cfs will be diverted through the existing Bridge Diversion without any 
construction of a project or any completion of works for beneficial use. The 
Districts' Application fails the bad faith test based on the threshold question of 
whether there will be a project, and whether there will be any construction of works 
for perfection of beneficial use. 
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 362). 
With regard to water flowing through the bridge diversion, the GWDs propose to simply 
identify unappropriated water in Billingsley Creek, utilize Rangen's existing bridge diversion, and 
without perfonning a single act, obtain a mitigation right to satisfy the mitigation obligation that 
the GWDs' members have towards Rangen. In this unique circumstance, the Director found that 
there was not an identifiable project that could be completed. The Director's interpretation of the 
Rule and his finding factual detennination are entitled to great deference and should not have been 
reversed. 
3. The Director's determination that the Districts do not intend to 
complete a project is supported by substantial competent evidence. 
After filing the application, the GWDs amended their proposal to include a pump that 
would take 4 cfs of water from the bridge diversion and divert it to Rangen's hatch house, green 
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house and small raceways (collectively "hatch house"). (A.R., Vol. 1, p. 193-4). This water would 
no longer go through the bridge diversion to the large raceways. This involves actually building a 
pump station on Rangen's property the bridge This involves a 
reconfiguration ofRangen's research hatchery that is not beneficial for the use of the hatchery. It 
is very important for this Court to understand that Rangcn has never diverted water from the bridge 
diversion to the hatch house. More importantly, Wayne Courtney, Rangen Executive Vice-
President, testified at the Administrative Hearing that Rangen did not want water to be diverted 
from the bridge diversion to the hatch house. (A.R., Tr., 248, 11. 7-18). The GWDs themselves 
have indicated that they would only move water to the extent Rangen wanted \vat er moved. ( A.R., 
Tr. p. 89, 1. 1-19). 
The GWDs' proposal to build the pump station appears to have been made solely to give 
the GWDs an argument that they have a project that can be completed. They are proposing to use 
eminent domain powers to force the reconfiguration of Rangen's research facility even though 
Rangen does not want it. The pump that the GWDs have proposed serves no mitigation or other 
useful purpose to Rangen. The Director concluded that the GWDs do not intend to complete any 
project, and his finding is supported by substantial competent evidence. As such, it should not 
have been reversed. 
C. The Court Should Affirm the Director's Denial of the Application Because 
the Districts' Application is Speculative. 
In Section 2 of their response brief, the GWDs state: "Rangen now contends that the 
District Court erred by addressing its argument concerning speculation." Districts· Response 
Brief, p. 29. It is important to clarify Rangen's position. When the GWDs appealed the Director's 
decision to the District Court, Rangen argued an alternative basis for affirming the Director's 
decision. Rangen argued that the decision could be affinned because the permit \Vas "speculative." 
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The District Court ruled that the pennit was not speculative, but also expressly declined to 
"prejudge" the issue of whether the GWDs actually have the eminent domain powers to perfect 
their application. (R., p. 202-03 ). light of this ruling, Rangen's position is that rather than make 
a legal determination that the pennit was not speculative, the District Court should have sent the 
case back to the Director to determine whether the Districts have the authority to actually perfect 
their application and whether that authority was properly exercised when the application was filed. 
There are two critical issues of fact which are uncontested. Those facts are that the GWDs 
do not own the place of use (POU) or point of diversion (POD) designated by the Application. 
The long-standing rule in Idaho and most every other jurisdiction with respect to perfecting a water 
right on property not owned by the water user, is as follows: 
It is quite generally held that a water right initiated by trespass is void. That is to 
say, one who diverts water and puts it to a beneficial use by aid of a trespass does 
not, pursuant to such trespass, acquire a \Yater right. Any claim of right thus 
initiated is void. 
Lemmon v. Hardy, 95 Idaho 778, 780, 519 P.2d 1168 (1974), citing Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 
256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931). (Emphasis added); see also, Joyce Livestock v. US.A., 144 Idaho 1, 18, 
156 P.3d 502, (2007); Branson v. Miracle, 107 Idaho 221,227,687 P.2d 1348 (1984). 
There are two ways for a party to perfect a water right when that party who is applying for 
a pennit does not own the POU or POD. The first way is for the party to have an agency 
relationship with the owner of the property where the water right is sought. Colorado Rh'er Water 
Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Company, 594 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1979); see e.g., 
Bacher v. State Engineer oflvevada, 146 P.3d 793, 799 (Nev. 2006). In this case, the uncontested 
fact is that the GWDs do not have any agency relationship with Rangen. 
The second way to perfect a water right for a party who does not own the POU or POD is 
to properly exercise eminent domain authority. Lemon v. Hardy, supra. This raises two separate 
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inquiries: (I) whether the GWDs have the legal authority to seek eminent domain; and (2) even if 
they have the right of eminent domain, whether the GWDs properly exercised this authority when 
they filed the application. Rangen addressed both of these 
important to clarify the following points. 
Opening Brief, but it is 
The first inquiry is whether the GWDs have the legal authority to seek eminent domain for 
the purposes of this permit. Exercising eminent domain in this case \Vould require not only the 
authority to condemn Rangen's bridge diversion, but also the authority to install a pump and 
reconfigure how water flows through the Rangen facility over Rangen's objection. On this issue, 
both the Director and the District Court declined to address whether the GWDs had the legal 
authority necessary to gain access to Rangen's property. On the issue of whether the GWDs had 
actual authority to exercise eminent domain, the trial court stated: 
Rangen also raises several arguments regarding the ability of the Districts to 
exercise their eminent domain powers to perfect their application for pennit. Since 
issues of that nature are more appropriately addressed in the context of a challenge 
to a condemnation proceeding, the Court, so as to not prejudge the issues, will not 
address these arguments. The fact that the Districts have the express statutory 
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for the condemnation of private 
property for easements, rights-of-way, and other rights of access to property 
necessary to the exercise of their mitigation powers is sufficient for the purposes of 
a speculation analysis. 
(R., p. 203). 
Second, regardless of whether the GWDs have the legal authority to exercise eminent 
domain, an important issue for this appeal is whether the GWDs actually considered and voted to 
exercise their eminent domain powers in connection with the filing of their application. 2 The 
GWDs are political subdivisions. Under their statutory powers, the GWDs have the authority to: 
2 The Districts contend that Rangen does not have standing to challenge the validity of the GWDs · actions. See 
Districts' Response Brief p. 45. Rangen has standing to contest the exercise of the GWDs' authority since the POU 
and POD for the water right under the application are wholly located on Rangen's property. Rangen has asserted the 
necessary "distinct palpable injury" necessary to have standing. See Young v. Ketchum, 137 Idaho l 02, 44 P.3d 1157 
(2002); Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508,248 P.3d 1243 (2011). 
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( 1) file applications for water rights, LC. § 42-5224(8); and (2) exercise eminent domain for rights 
way, I.C. § 42-5224(13). Under LC. § 42-5223(3), the statute that immediately precedes the 
statutory of the Board, the only way for the GWDs to their statutory powers is for 
a majority of the Board to act at a meeting where a quornm exists: 
The board of directors shall hold a regular monthly meeting in the district's office 
on the first Tuesday in every month or such date each month as it shall fix by 
resolution, and such special meetings as may be required for the proper 
transaction of business. Special meetings may be held on seventy-t\VO (72) hours' 
notice of the chairman or a majority of the members. A majority shall constitute 
a quorum for the transaction of business and the concurrence of a majority of 
the members shall be necessary to constitute the action of the board. All 
meetings of the board shall be public and ali records of the board shall be open to 
the inspection of any member water user, or representative thereof during business 
hours. 
LC. § 42-5223(3) (Emphasis added). 
In this case, the uncontested fact is that the GWDs never held any meeting to authorize the 
filing of the application and submitted no evidence establishing their Boards' decision to authorize 
the exercise of their eminent domain authority. The only evidence in the record from the GWDs 
is the testimony of Lynn Carlquist, a Director of the North Snake Ground Water District, who 
testified that no meeting was ever held to consider and vote on the filing of the application: 
Q. (Haemmerle); That's my question, whether there was an official board meeting on 
behalf of your groundwater district to take action to filed the permit. 
A. (Carlquist) Not for this specific permit, no. But there were - there were the 
conference discussion over the phone to say "Yes, we approve. Let's go after it and 
get this pennit filed for it." 
Q. But there was no official convening of the board to take that kind of action? 
A. Not in person. 
Q. And you don't really recall what any of the other districts did or didn't do, do you? 
A. No, I don't. I do know that there were phone conversations with the other districts. 
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(A.R., Tr., p. 69, IL 19-25; p. 70, 11. 1-8). (Emphasis added). 
Resolutions from the North Snake Groundwater District (A.R., Exh. 1076) and Magic 
Ground\vater District (A.R., 1077) ( collectively "Resolutions") \Vere produced at the 
administrative hearing on the application. The Southwest Irrigation District never produced a 
Resolution. The Resolutions were dated September 16, 2014, or a single day before the 
administrative hearing on the Application. According to Lynn Carlquist, the Resolutions were 
executed at a Special Meeting just prior to the administrative hearing held on September 1 7, 2014. 
There were no Resolutions authorizing the law firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, 
Chartered (''Racine") to execute the Application for the pennit prior to September 16, 2014. 
Q. So there were no corporate resolutions at the time any of the pennits were filed? 
A. That's correct. 
(A.R., Tr., 31, 11. 22-24). 
Furthermore, the Resolutions only authorized the filing of the application. The Resolutions 
did not authorize the initiation of any eminent domain proceeding against Rangen. The 
Resolutions, in pertinent part, stated: 
RESOLVED, the Board confinns the authority of Racine to file application for 
water right permit no. 36-16976 on behalf of the District, and to represent the 
District in all other current and future proceedings before the IDWR to which the 
District is a party; and 
Further RESOLVED, the Board reaffims the Special Power of Attorney for Water 
Rights executed by the District on May 2, 2014, confirming the authority of Racine 
to represent the District in all current and future proceeding before the IDWR to 
\Vhich the District is a party. 
(See e.g., A.R., Exh. 1076 and 1077). 
Political subdivisions, in this case the groundwater districts, only have authority to act in 
duly noticed and constituted meetings. LC. § 42-5223. If the government body does not properly 
exercise its authority, the government body's lawyers cannot act on their own and validate an 
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illegally exercised authority of the political subdivision. Attorneys for political subdivisions are 
not authorized to take action for the political body, without the political body holding an authorized 
to transact 
To summarize, Lemmon r. Hardy is controlling. The GWDs do not own the POD or POU 
for the water right described in the application. The Department's Rules require that a pennit 
Applicant "shall have legal access to the property necessary to construct and operate the proposed 
project, [or] has the authority to exercise eminent domain authority to obtain such access." IDAPA 
37.03.08.45.c.i In this case, there are no findings that the GWDs, in fact or law, have the authority 
to seek eminent domain to take Rang en's property to perfect this application. Even if they do, the 
GWDs failed to present any evidence that those powers were exercised in an open meeting. For 
these reasons, the application should have been denied, or the case remanded to the Director for 
further findings. 
D. Attorneys are Not Exempt from the Requirement to Submit Evidence of 
Authority \Vhen Signing an Application for Permit on Behalf of a Client. 
The Districts contend that Rangen 1s asking IDWR to interpret IDAPA 
3 7.03.08.035.03.b.xiv in a manner that goes beyond its plain language. Districts' Response Brief, 
p. 40. The Districts argue: "The Rule states applications 'may be signed by a person having a 
current power of attorney.' It does not mention licensed attorneys, let alone require licensed 
attorneys to provide a written 'pmver of attorney' before acting on behalf of their clients." See id. 
The Districts' have misconstrued Rangen's position. 
Rangen's position is that the plain lan6ruagc of Rule 35.03.b requires an attorney to submit 
evidence of authority to sign an application for pennit when it is filed with the Department. 
Evidence of that authority may be in the fonn of a power of attorney or it may be in another fonn 
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like a motion or a resolution. Rangen's point is that attorneys are not exempt from the requirement 
to submit evidence of the express authorization of their client. Rule 35.03.b states in relevant part: 
b. The following information shall be shown on an application for permit form and 
submitted together with the statutory fee to an office of the department before the 
application for pennit may be accepted for filing by the department. 
* * * 
xii. The application form shall be signed by the applicant listed on the 
application or evidence must be submitted to show that the signatorv has 
authoritv to sign the application. An application in more than one (I) name shall 
be signed by each applicant unless the names are joined by "or" or "and/or." 
xiii. Applications by corporations, companies or municipalities or other 
organizations shall be signed by an officer of the corporation or company or 
an elected official of the municipality or an individual authorized by the 
organization to sign the application. The signatory's title shall be shown with the 
signature. 
xiv. Applications may be signed by a person having a current "power of attorney" 
authorized by the applicant. A copy of the "power of attorney" shall be included 
with the application. 
IDAPA 37.03.08.035.03.b (emphasis added). 
The Districts contend that attorneys are exempt from this rule by virtue of the attorney-
client relationship. Their position is that everyone knows that Thomas J. Budge and Randy Budge 
represent the Districts and it would be "utterly unjust" to enforce the requirement of submitting 
evidence of express authorization. They claim that this is a mere "technicality" and a "trap for the 
unwary." Districts' Response Brief, p. 45. The Districts' arguments miss the mark for several 
reasons. 
To begin with, the Districts' reliance on Storey v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 
32 Idaho 388, 183 P. 990 (1919) is misplaced. The Districts quoted the following language from 
Storey to support their position: 
The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency. The answer to 
whether an attorney can bind his client by a stipulation rests in whether the subject 
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of the stipulation falls within the scope of the attorney's implied authority, and if it 
is outside the attorney's implied authority, whether the client has actually 
authorized or later ratified his actions. It is generally recognized that an attorney 
has ... the general implied or apparent authority to enter into or make such 
agreements or stipulations, with respect to procedural or remedial matters, as 
appear, in the progress of the cause, to be necessary or expedient for the 
advancement of his client's interest or to accomplishment of the purpose for which 
the attorney is employed." Yet it is \veil settled that" ... The implied authority of 
an attorney ordinarily does not extend to the doing of acts which will result in 
surrender or giving up any substantial right of the client. 
Districts' Response Brief, p. 41, quoting Storey, 32 Idaho 388 at 392, 183 P. 990 at 991. This 
language does not support the Districts' position, but rather, undermines it. 
The Storey decision makes it clear that an attorney is the agent of the client. While an 
attorney has implied authority to handle procedural or remedial matters that come up while a case 
is pending, the attorney cannot do anything that affects the client's substantive rights without 
express authority. The Storey Court held: "It is generally recognized that an attorney has ' ... the 
general implied or apparent authority to enter into or make such agreements or stipulations, with 
respect to procedural or remedial matters, as appear, in the progress of the cause, to be necessary 
or expedient for the advancement of his client's interest or to accomplishment of the purpose for 
which the attorney is employed.'" Id., 32 Idaho 388 at 392, 183 P. 990 at 991 (Emphasis added). 
The signing and filing of an application for pennit to appropriate the waters of this state is not a 
procedural or remedial matter. 
The appropriation of water creates a real property interest, and as discussed above, will 
require the Districts to exercise their eminent domain powers against Rangen since the POU and 
POD are located on Rangen's property. See Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87,558 P.2d 1048 
(1977); Neilson v. Parker, 19 Idaho 727, 115 P. 488 (1911); LC.§ 55-101. The decision to file 
the application for pennit is a serious undertaking that can only be authorized by the Districts' 
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Boards of Directors. The signing and filing of the Districts' application was not part of the 
attorney's implied authority. 
While the Districts seem to balk at the assertion that an attorney must submit written 
evidence of authority to sign an application for pennit, this Court has made it clear that attorneys 
are not exempt from this type ofrequirement. In Ogden v. Griffith, I 49 Idaho 489, 494, 236 P.3d 
1249, 1254 (2010), this Court held that the written power of attorney requirement set forth in I.C. 
§ 9-503, the statutory codification of the statute of frauds for real estate transactions, applies to 
attorneys. Section 9-503 states: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding 
one (I) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating 
thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than 
by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in vvriting, subscribed by 
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
I.C. § 9-503 ( emphasis added). 
The failure to submit evidence of Thomas J. Budge's authority to sign with the application 
means that the Districts' application was incomplete under Rule 35.01.d and no priority was 
established: 
All applications for permit to appropriate public water or trust water of the state of 
Idaho shall be on the form provided by the department entitled "Application for 
Pennit to Appropriate the Public Waters of the State ofldaho" and shall include all 
necessary information as described in Subsection 035.03. An application for permit 
that is not complete as described in Subsection 035.03 vvill not be accepted for filing 
and will be returned along with any fees submitted to the person submitting the 
application. No priority will be established by an incomplete application. 
Applications meeting the requirements of Subsection 035.03. will be accepted for 
filing and will be endorsed by the department as to the time and date received. The 
acceptability of applications requiring clarification or corrections shall be 
determined by the Director. 
ID APA 37.03.08.035.01.d ( emphasis added); see also ID APA 37.03.08.035.02.b ("The priority of 
an application ... is established as of the time and date the application is received in complete 
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fonn .... )" While Rangen contends there are serious issues as to whether the Districts ever 
la1,vfully authorized the filing of the application (see Section C above), the earliest priority date 
that could possibly be given to the Districts' application for permit is the date of the hearing when 
the Districts submitted the resolutions authorizing the Racine finn to sign on behalf of the Districts 
(see A.R., Exh. 1076 and I 077) and Lynn Carlquist testified. 
The Districts' final ar&'l.nnent is that it 1,vould be "utterly unjust" to enforce the requirement 
that an attorney submit evidence of authority when signing and filing an application for permit. 
What would be unjust in this case is the granting of a pennit for what the Director expressly found 
was nothing but a "mitigation shell game." 
E. The Director correctly held that granting the application was not in the local 
public interest. 
The Districts filed this application seeking to appropriate \Vater for "mitigation." Such a 
purpose of use presumes that the manner in which the water is used will mitigate for depletions 
due to the applicant's use of other water rights. As Rangen has argued in this matter, the simple 
description "mitigation" does not describe how the use of the water will actually mitigate. The 
Districts have steadfastly refused to explain how this water right would benefit anyone that is 
suffering injury due to depletions caused by groundwater pumping. The Director detennined that 
there was no benefit from granting this pennit and that it is not in the local public interest. 
The Director is required pursuant to LC. § 42-203A(5) to deny a water right "if it will 
conflict with the local public interest as defined in LC. § 42-202B." The local public interest is 
defined as "the interests that the people in the area directly affected by the proposed water use have 
in the effects of such use on the public \Vater resource." LC. § 42-202B. The Director is well 
aware of water shortages suffered not only by Rangen, but also other water users in the local area 
and downstream on Billingsley Creek. Approval of this application has the potential to affect the 
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public water resources dramatically. Ultimately, the Districts intend to use this water right as part 
of a mitigation plan that \Vould allmv widespread continued depletion of the ESP A. Of course, the 
will be able to deny that mitigation plan and will almost certainly be required to so 
given that this is merely a "mitigation shell game. "3 Ho\vever, there is no reason to require the 
Director to delay consideration of these issues for a mitigation plan proceeding. 
The Director found that: 
The District's application is the epitome of a mitigation shell game. The Districts' 
Application brings no new water to the already diminished flows of the Curren 
Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek. 
(A.R., Vol. 2, p. 364, i\34). The approval of a "mitigation" water right that provides no mitigation 
benefit has a direct effect upon the public water resource because it allows continued depletion of 
the aquifer without mitigation. Consequently, the Director did not exceed his authority by denying 
the Districts' application. The District Court erred by failing to give the appropriate deference to 
the Director's interpretation and application of I.C. § 42-202B. See JR. Simplot Co. Inc. v. Idaho 
State Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849,820 P.2d 1206 (1991). 
F. The Director erred -when he allo\ved "mitigation" as a permitted purpose of 
use. 
Rangen stands on the arguments it made in its Opening Brief concerning why "mitigation" 
as a proposed purpose of use should not be allowed. See, Rangen, Inc. 's Opening Brief, p. 28. 
One issue, however, needs further elaboration. 
Both the District Court and Director relied on the definition of"mitigation plan" under I.C. 
§ 42-520 I ( 13) to support their respective conclusions that the GWDs' application for "mitigation" 
3 Regarding the Director's finding that the GWDs' application brings no new water to the already diminished flows 
of the Curren Tunnel or headwaters of Billingsley Creek, the District Court noted that "[I]ndeed, this consideration 
may have relevance in any proceeding seeking the approval of any mitigation plan for which the appropriation is 
intended,'' (R., p. 199). 
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water should be allowed. LC. § 42-5201(13) defines "mitigation plan" as a "plan to prevent or 
compensate for material injury to holders of senior water right caused by the diversion and uses of 
water holders of junior priority groundwater rights who are participants in a mitigation plan." 
The Director, incorporating the decision of the Hearing Officer, and using the definition of 
"mitigation plan" under Section 42-5201, concluded: "In Order for the proposed senior use to be 
viable, it must prevent material injury to senior water rights or compensate senior water right 
holders for material injury." (A.R .. p. 358). Applying this definition, the Director concluded that 
the GWDs' application "proposes to compensate Rangen for diminishment of the source." (A.R., 
p. 358). There were no findings that the GWDs' application would "prevent material injury." 
The GWDs' application does not "compensate" Rangen for any material injury. Both the 
GWDs' application and Rangen's pennit propose using the very same non-consumptive water. 
(Exh. 2001). (A.R., p. 189). Regardless of whether the GWDs' application is granted, Rangen 
will be diverting the very same water under its own right and applying it to its own beneficial use. 
Even if the Districts' pennit is granted, they will not be providing anything that Rangen does not 
already have the right to use. 
The proposed use also does not prevent material injury. The GWDs' members are 
obligated to compensate for the injury they are causing to the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer. The 
proposed use does not stop the depletion of the aquifer in any way, shape or fonn and it does not 
add new water. 4 Most fundamentally, regardless of whether the pennit is granted, Rangen already 
has the right to use this \Vater under its own pennit. As such, the application should have been 
denied. 
4 The District Court concluded that the fact that the GWDs did not being "new water"' might have "relevance in any 
proceeding seeking the approval of any mitigation plan for which the appropriation is intended." (R., p. 199). 
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II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Rangen's Opening Brief and those set forth above, Rangen 
respectfully requests that the Court affinn the Director's decision to 
for permit. 
Districts' application 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2016. 
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